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Abstract
With the emergence of innovative (networked) organization forms such as enhanced supply chain
collaboration and modern forms of public-private partnerships (PPP), effective and efficient
collaboration among network participants becomes crucial but often difficult to achieve. One of
the leading factors which cause such defective collaboration is the asymmetric information issue
among the network participants. Two identifiable problems resulted by the asymmetric
information are the moral hazard and adverse selection problems. Former studies mainly
positioned asymmetric information problems within the context of traditional business
environment; in this paper we suggest that similar problems may also occur in the Government to
Business (G2B) context. We discuss these issues via a collaborative pilot case study (hereafter,
Beer Living Lab) between the Dutch Tax and Customs Administration (DutchTCA) and a Dutch
beer company (Beer Co.). The paper reveals that both moral hazard and adverse selection
problems may occur during the G2B interactions and tamper the relationships between the two. In
addressing these problems, we propose an advanced information technology (IT) solution, drawing
upon an effective and efficient information sharing schema that can on the one hand minimize the
moral hazard by enhancing supply chain management for the business and on the other hand
preventing tax fraud for the government. Further we argue that the application of the advanced IT
may serve as a strong signaling and screening tool for overcoming the adverse selection problem
during the PPP forming and result in a win-win situation. The insights learned should benefit those
involved in various inter-organizational business networks, partnership as well as supply chain
management settings.

Keywords: Asymmetric information, Inter-organizational networks, Information sharing, PPP,
Procedure design.
Introduction
The emergence of new lateral organizational forms (e.g., Internet-based supply chain partnerships)
has been a phenomenon for e-business over the last decade. Collaborative and networked interorganizational forms have provided competitive advantages that a single organization can hardly
achieve alone. Not only industry can benefit from such inter-organizational networks, the public
sector can benefit from forming collaborative networks with businesses as well. Potential benefits
are clearly identifiable, especially in the government tax and customs domain. For example, the
estimated annual savings of introducing electronic invoicing systems across the EU governments
would exceed €50 billion (EU Commission, 2006b). Somehow, forming such G2B collaborations
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are often difficult. Facing the current situation that the government procedures are mostly still
paper based and not necessarily harmonized, and different concerns between government and
business (e.g., different value perspectives, legislation/political concerns), the problems caused by
the information asymmetry are almost inevitable and will temper the effectiveness of the network
collaboration.
Different with former studies, we expand the theory of asymmetric information to the IS network
research and focus on the role of IT in solving with the asymmetric information problems; in
addition, we extend the analysis of information asymmetry from the traditional B2B environment
to the G2B inter-organizational network settings. In this paper, we provide clearer insights on: 1)
how information may influence organizational behaviour and thus play an important role for
setting up the inter-organizational networks; 2) what the special concerns of information
asymmetry and its related problems are under the G2B context; 3) especially, we provide a case
demonstration on how such problems can be identified in the real world setting and how interorganizational IT solutions should be conducted to cope with the asymmetric information
problems.
With a current case study of the Beer Living Lab (BeerLL), we identify two typical asymmetric
information problems, namely, the moral hazard (happens when collecting business tax) and the
adverse selection (happens when government selecting/certifying private partners) problems. A
modern IT solution (TREC with EPCIS, see section 4) that may provide an effective and efficient
information sharing schema is proposed. The solution mitigates the moral hazard problem by on
one hand enhancing supply chain management (SCM) for businesses and on the other hand
preventing tax fraud for the government. We further argue that, the application of advanced IT
(e.g., TREC device) may serve as a strong signalling and screening tool from preventing the
adverse selection problem for the PPP forming. The results from this paper may provide EU
governments more effective selection criteria for the AEO certification.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, In Section 2, we give a short introduction of the
theory of asymmetric information and the two economic problems (moral hazard and adverse
selection) caused by the information asymmetry. In Section 3, we focus on the asymmetric
information problems in the G2B relationships and how this may influence the relationship
forming. In Section 4, a case study of Beer Living Lab is introduced and recommended solutions
are elaborated. Finally, in Section 5, conclusions and discussion about future research are
presented.

Information Asymmetry
The theory of asymmetric information has been lively developed in the field of economic research
for the last two decades. The prominent foundations for this theory were established by George
Akerlof (Akerlof, 1970), Michael Spence (Spence, 1973) and Joseph Stiglitz (Rothschild &
Stiglitz, 1976). Information asymmetry occurs when one party has more or better information
than the other party; it assumes that at least one party to a transaction has better relevant
information whereas the other(s) do not. Typically it happens in a transaction that the seller who
knows more about the product than the buyer (e.g., selling a second-hand car), however, it is also
possible for the reverse to be true: the buyer knows more than the seller (e.g., buying an insurance
policy). Information asymmetry has mass effect on the business networks, e.g., supply chains.
Fiala (2005) indicates that information asymmetry is a key source of supply chain inefficiency and
strategic partnerships and information sharing can help to cope with the “bullwhip effect”1 (see
(Lee et al., 1997b; Lee et al., 1997a)) caused by the information asymmetry in supply chains.
Because of lacking information and information lagging among supply partners, the
demand/supply in supply chain can not be well managed and the quality of the product is hard to
maintain. Mishra et al. (2007) point out that information distortion may reduce the benefit levels or
1

It describes growing variation upstream in a supply chain, which is one of the most poignant
demonstrations that decentralized decision making can lead to poor supply chain performance. For details,
refer to Lee et al. [20, 21].
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even stop information sharing in supply chains. There are two typical problems asymmetric
information may trigger, namely, moral hazard and adverse selection.
Moral hazard refers to “situations where one side of the market can't observe the actions of the
other. For this reason it is sometimes called a hidden action problem” (Varian, 2002). In addition,
it means the chance, or hazard, that a party in a transaction with more information about its
intentions or actions behaves in a way that a party with less information would consider
inappropriate, or in the extreme, "immoral". It arises because an individual or institution in a
transaction does not bear the full consequences or can hide the consequences of its actions without
counter party knowing, and therefore has a tendency or incentive to act inappropriately. An
example of moral hazard is when people are more likely to behave recklessly if insured, either
because the insurer cannot observe this behaviour or cannot effectively retaliate against it, for
example by failing to renew the insurance.
Adverse selection generally refers to a market process in which bad results occur due to
information asymmetries between buyers and sellers, where the "bad" products or customers are
more likely to be selected and the “good” ones are driven out of the market. It has been discussed
extensively in the fields of economics, insurance, and risk theory. An example of adverse selection
in the insurance market is when people who are of high risk are more likely to buy insurance,
because the insurance company cannot effectively discriminate against them, the same premiums
are set by the insurer for both groups with high risk and low risk. The insurance company
anticipates or learns that the cost of the combined policy holders exceeds that of the general
population, and sets the higher premiums accordingly. The result is that people with lower risks
tend to go uninsured. Furthermore, as more low risk people are leaving, the premiums have to be
raised further such that more people are driven out of the policy. Another famous example is
illustrated by (Akerlof, 1970) for the second hand car market, which is referred as the "lemon
market"--people buying used cars do not know whether they are "lemons" (bad cars) or "cherries"
(good ones), so they are willing to pay a average price that lies in between the lemons and cherries.
As a result, the same situation as in the insurance market happens here, the “cherries” will be
driven out and “lemons” will dominate the market. The similar findings are also supported by the
recent e-commerce research of Liao & Cheung (2001) that the “poor vendor quality, especially as
regards “lemons”, is identified as a significant disincentive to virtual retailing over the Internet”.
Both moral hazard and adverse selection can be explained in the agency theory [related theory
with asymmetric information, more details see (Eisenhardt, 1989)] as agency problems, which
comprise two forms that agency problems may take shape. Arrow (1984) equates these two terms
with hidden action and hidden information, respectively. Moral hazard arises when the action
undertaken by the agent is unobservable and has a differential value to the agent as compared to
the principal. Adverse selection problems arise when the agent has more information than the
principal.
With the fast development of the IT (information technology), more recently, the theory of
asymmetric information has been expanded in the field of economics of information technology
and discussed by various researches [e.g., (Garicano & Kaplan, 2001; Varian, 2002; Varian et al.,
2004; Wigand et al., 1997; Stiglitz, 2000; Kauffman & Mohtadi, 2003)]. These papers however,
mainly focus on the economic impacts of the information technology (i.e., the value of
information, information goods and involving transaction costs etc.); very little insights have been
given on how IT should be implemented to cope with various asymmetric information problems.

Asymmetric Information Problems between Business and
Government
As discussed in the last section, former studies mainly focus on the effect of asymmetric
information under the market oriented (e.g., labor market, commodity market, insurance market
and stock market) business context. Government, on the other hand was perceived to be out of the
scope of the free market, due to its traditional functions of rule setting, intervening and controlling.
For this reason, very little attention has been paid to the asymmetric information issues between
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profit driven businesses and public good oriented government. However, the recent movement of
the public sector transformation of forming the so called public-private partnerships (PPP), which
a government and a private entity collaboratively undertake traditionally public activity (Naschold
& von Otter, 1996), has made the boundary between the government and private business become
less and less obvious. In this section we put our focal point on this transforming regime and
discuss whether asymmetric information problems of moral hazard and adverse selection can also
be triggered during the business and government interaction.

Moral Hazard in Government Control
One of the most important roles for government in the G2B relationship is the government control
role. Such control is especially important for the Tax and Customs Administration, as it is directly
related with the national tax revenues. EU governments have been experiencing severe loss from
various tax frauds. According to EU Commission (2006a), estimates of tax fraud of 2 to 2.5% of
GDP are mentioned, which is about 200 to 250 billion Euro per year at EU level. Such tax fraud is
a fitting example and can be interpreted as the moral hazard problem caused by the symmetric
information.
An illustrative example is the VAT (Value added tax) collection. Simply two parties are involved
here: a private company who is obliged to declare VAT and pay the tax; and a Tax office as a
government agency who audits the tax report and control the VAT collection. Under perfect
information, tax office obtains complete information and knows about company’s exact operation;
in the mean time the private company reports and pays full amount of VAT honestly to the Tax
office (Figure 1a). However in the real world, the private company always knows better about its
own operating details and the real value of transactions, whereas the Tax office does not. Private
company has better information than the Tax office and thus has incentives to hide and even
falsify certain information from Tax office to get tax advantages. If such incentive is obvious and
easy to achieve without tax office knowing, or the penalty of defaulting is not severer enough, the
private company will choose to cheat --- a moral hazard problem is caused that the tax office
receives less VAT than it should have (Figure 1b).

Figure 1a. Ideal situation of tax control under perfect information

Figure 1b. Moral hazard of tax control (tax fraud) under asymmetric information
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Adverse Selection in G2B Partnership Forming
The second problem --- adverse selection is more complex than the first one. It happens often
when government bodies select private partners and give certificates to these companies. The
current in the spotlight Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) certificate may serve here as a good
example.
The idea of AEO is that each EU Member State Customs Administration can establish partnerships
with private sectors and certify them with AEO certifications. The involvement of the private
companies in AEO will enhance the safety and security of international trade and the certified
AEOs will enjoy tangible benefits such as fast customs clearance and simplified procedures.
According to EU parliament and the Council (2005), “Customs authorities, if necessary following
consultation with other competent authorities, shall grant, the status of ‘Authorized Economic
Operator’ (AEO) to any economic operator established in the customs territory of the Community.
An AEO shall benefit from facilitations with regard to customs controls relating to security and
safety and/or from simplifications provided for under the customs rules.”
A critical issue here is that the AEO certificate is quite unlike other governmental requirements; it
is voluntary rather than compulsory. It requires “… no obligation for economic operators to
become AEOs, it is a matter of the operators' own choice based on their specific situation. Nor is
there any obligation for AEOs to require that their business partners have also to obtain AEO
status” (EU Commission, 2007). Companies are no longer obliged but can bargain and make their
own decisions whether or not to qualify for the AEO certificate (at the same time also fulfilling the
requirements). The increased bargain power from business side makes it rather difficult to promote
the idea of AEO, as each individual company has its own concerns and specific reasons of joining
or not. It would be convenient for the EU government to set a non-exclusive single policy for all
the companies who are willing to participate. However, facing the divergences among
multinationals and SMEs (small and median sized enterprises), such a single policy is very
difficult to reach. Though a great effort has been made in developing the most recent AEO
guidelines (EU Commission, 2007), the implementation of these guidelines still needs to occur.
A problem raised here is that if the government can not effectively differentiate companies and
only applies a single standard to all the companies in the certificate market, similar adverse
selection problem like in the insurance market may occur: The “good” (compliant) companies tend
not to join because the AEO requirement is too strict and they see no fair value for them to
participate ---“We are compliant companies with good reputation, and our current procedure is
simpler than others anyway, why should we invest more to get the AEO certificate?” (Based on
interviews with a Netherlands-based international beer company). On the other hand, the “bad”
(cheating) companies may see more visible benefit (less checking and simplified procedure may
create an easier way of making fraud) and are more willing the get the certificate (See Figure 2).
The original purpose of the government is to provide minimal physical control and simplified
procedure via the AEO certificate to the compliant companies and enforce more control effort on
the cheating companies. As indicated in the interview with the Dutch Tax and Customs
Administration (DutchTCA) --- “If companies are already in good control themselves, why should
we (DutchTCA) waste our resource to exert extra control on them?” However, the consequences
of the adverse selection problem may reverse government’s expectation: as the “good” companies
could not get enough incentive to join and will be automatically driven out of the “certificate
market” by the “bad” ones. And a continuous scenario is even worse: as more “bad” companies
will take the certificate and commit fraud, the AEO requirement will be set even stricter and
become less desirable for any “good” companies to join --- a market failure is created.
Nevertheless, there are remedies for adverse selection problem. Further elaboration on this issue
will be discussed in later sections of this paper.
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Figure 2. Adverse selection caused during AEO certification procedure (Market failure)

Case study: Beer Living Lab
To further elaborate issues discussed above, we present a real life case study of a collaborative
project (referred to as the Beer Living Lab) between the Dutch Tax and Customs Administration
(DutchTCA) and a NL-based international beer company (Beer Co.). The purpose of the Beer
Living Lab (BeerLL) is to create a win-win situation between the business and government that on
the one hand the administrative burden will be lowered for business and on the other hand the tax
fraud will be minimized and better security and control can be facilitated for the government [the
detailed discussion of the living lab concept itself is revealed by (Tan et al., 2006; Baida et al.,
2007b)]. The BeerLL is a unique case study that provides researchers a great opportunity of
carrying out multi-facet researches including eCustoms study (van Stijn et al., 2007), control
procedure redesign (Baida et al., 2007a; Liu et al., 2006; Liu et al., 2007) and collaborative
network study (Frößler et al., 2007; Rukanova et al., 2007) etc. In proceeding with the research,
we found that the informational aspect of the BeerLL is rather interesting that it influences not only
organizational control procedures but also inter-organizational network forming. We link the
underlying phenomenon in BeerLL with the theory of information asymmetry and discuss how it
may play a role here. Further we elicit how advanced IT solutions (e.g., the BeerLL solution) may
cope with the asymmetric information problems and create a win-win situation between the
government and businesses.

Moral Hazard in BeerLL
Beer Co. (NL-based, but has international subsidiaries like Beer Co. UK, US) as an international
brewery company carries out a huge amount of trade everyday, involving with multiple supply
chain partners and government agencies. The moral hazard problem mainly appears in two places
in its inter-organizational trade procedures, namely along supply chains and between business and
government interactions. Along the supply chain, Beer Co. is involved with many suppliers,
distributors around the globe. From raw material to the final product at the customers, the amount
of information interchanged in Beer Co’s supply chain is considerable. To minimize problems
caused by the information asymmetry, Beer Co. would like to have an information sharing schema
that can provide full control and transparency of its supply chains. Such schema shall not only
enhance the order-make management of Beer Co., but also safeguard its brand image and break
down possible counterfeit that may be caused by the fraudulent supply chain partners.
The other area that moral hazard problem can be triggered is laying underneath the interaction
between businesses and government, especially in the tax report and Customs declaration
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procedures when DutchTCA collecting taxes and monitoring business activities of the Beer Co. As
we discussed before, businesses always have better information than the government about their
own operation. They may have an incentive to hide certain (fraudulent) actions to achieve certain
benefits. According to our interview with Beer Co. and DutchTCA, several frauds can be involved
in the BeerLL trade procedure. However, the current tax and Customs control procedure is not
effective enough to cope with these problems. The main reason behind is that the current Custom
control is mainly based on the paper based AAD-doc (accompanying administrative document),
EW 2 (excise warehouse) and physical inspections these three methods. Given an example of
Customs control procedures when Beer Co. exporting beer from NL to UK. The AAD-doc
performs an essential role in this Customs control procedure. Two roles are performed by the
AAD-doc, one as export evidence when stamped by EW and UK Customs, the other to identify the
cargo in case of a physical cargo inspection en route. The AAD-doc accompanies the beer from the
Netherlands to the UK and is stamped by the EW, then by Customs UK, as a proof that the goods
have arrived in the UK. Customs UK send the stamped AAD-doc back to the EW who will
forward it back to BeerCo NL. For control purpose, Customs NL periodically checks BeerCo NL’s
excise declarations. For the beer that BeerCo NL sold outside the Netherlands, excise exemption is
given by default and will be verified afterwards by comparing excise declarations with AAD-docs.
There exist two major disadvantages of this procedure 1) Timeliness: transferring of the paperbased AAD-docs can take weeks or even months, and the verification is done several months later.
In practice, this checking is often not done at all because it is too labor intensive. As a result, Beer
Co. NL only submits AAD-docs upon request of Customs NL; 2) Too many parties’ involvement:
the AAD-doc based control relies on many commercial parties (e.g., Beer Co. NL and UK, EW,
shipping company) who may have direct interest of violating this control to reach their own
financial interests. Each one of them (or colluded) has the opportunities to alter or hidden critical
information/actions (especially, paper based AAD-doc can be easily falsified) from the other,
which may result in moral hazard and possible control fraud. We interviewed and identify these
possible moral hazard problems in Table 1. According to the EU Commission [8], excise fraud for
alcohol in the EU amounts to €1.5 billion yearly, approximately 8% of the total excise duties
receipts on alcoholic beverages. DutchTCA as a government control agency would like to detect
and minimize all the possible tax fraud. It requires an information sharing system with control
efficiency and effectiveness that on the one hand can minimize administrative burden and on the
other hand may facilitate effective auditing control.

2

An excise warehouse is a warehouse which has been authorized by the authorities for the deposit without
payment of duty of goods liable to excise duty.
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Table 1: Examples of moral hazard in the Beer LL
Moral
Hazard
Problem
1.

Possible defaulting parties

Description of hidden actions

Current control
mechanisms

Single party defaulting

One of the parties along the supply chain does
not fulfill(intentionally or unintentionally) its
responsibilities and hides this from others

AAD-doc., EW, Physical
checks

1.1

Beer Co. NL

AAD-doc.

1.2

Beer Co. UK

1.3

Beer Co. NL/ Beer
Co. UK

1.4

Excise
warehouse
(EW)
Retailer with EW

Beer Co. NL does not pay excise of beer within
NL (Claim beer selling abroad but actually sells
in NL)
Beer Co. UK sends falsified AAD back to Beer
Co. NL, but does not register it in their
administration nor reports to Customs. Beer Co.
UK sells beer without paying excise
Beer Co. NL/UK presents a product as a
product from another category(soft drink
instead of beer)
EW does not pay or pay less excise (rarely)
Retailer with EW does not pay or pay less
excise
A party buys goods from Beer Co. NL and
“virtually” ships the goods to a country with
low excise percentages (e.g. Poland), but sells
them in NL or UK.
Parties impose to be trustworthy companies
(like Beer Co.) by sending goods packed with
the Beer Co. label and falsely stating that the
product is indeed made by Beer Co. By doing
so fake parties enjoys less control than it should
have and will not pay excises over these
products, even
Carriers (criminal truck drivers) smuggle illegal
goods within Beer Co. containers

AAD-doc.

1.5
E.g.

Virtual shipment

Fake Beer Co.

Smuggling

2.

Multi-party collusion
2.1

E.g.

Beer Co. NL& Beer
Co. UK
2.2
Beer Co. UK &
Retailer with EW
2.3
Beer Co.(NL+UK) &
retailer with EW
Black market

Parties collude with each other in order not to
get advantage of the system (e.g. pay less
excises)
Beer Co. NL& Beer Co. UK collude with each
other in order not to pay excises
Beer Co. UK & Retailer with EW collude with
each other in order not to pay excises
Beer Co.(NL+UK) & retailer with EW collude
with each other in order not to pay excises
Beer Co. NL ships excisable goods to UK
accompanied with an AAD, but Beer Co. UK
(can be other companies) colludes with retailer
with EW. The goods disappear in the black
market without excise payment. Customs will
not receive AAD for the goods. The fraud will
be revealed but too late-- three month period

EW

Physical checks (Random
checks on Beer Co.
NL/UK)
EW certification

AAD( Documentation),
physical stop checks
Physical stop checks &
Authorization (Possibly
Beer
Co.
AEO
certification?)

Asset safe guard &
Physical checks (Random
checks on Beer Co.
NL/UK)
Third party checking, and
random physical checks
EW
AAD-doc.
Physical checks
EW & Reconciliation
(Independent check of
performance)

Redesign Solution: Effective Information Sharing Schema with Imbedded IT Based
Control
To cope with the problems identified above, Beer Co. together with DutchTCA, academic
researchers and interested technology providers designed an innovative TO-BE solutions based on
advance IT. This solution has been piloted since year 2007 and has received quite positive
feedbacks from various fields in and outside the project. The redesign solution sets up effective
inter-organizational information sharing schema as well as imbedding IT based control mechanism
into the system.
• First, the BeerLL solution provides an effective and efficient information sharing schema
that links Beer Co., its supply chain partners and DutchTCA together. A simple but useful
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•

definition of inter-organizational information system (IOS) is given by Cash and
Konsynski (1985) as "an automated information system shared by two or more
companies". An IOS is built around information technology that facilitates the creation,
storage, transformation, and transmission of information, which differs from an internal
information system by allowing information to be sent across organizational boundaries.
Wigand et al. (1997) discuss in their book various of organizational boundaries and
information models for setting up IOS that can cope with these limitations. The setting up
of the BeerLL ISO relies on the Electronic Product Code Information Services (EPCIS)
using a Service-Oriented Architecture. Container Information Services (CIS) use the
EPCIS non-proprietary standards of EPCglobal3. The data sharing mechanisms use a
Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) to allow secure information sharing between supply
chain partners as well as government agencies. All supply chain partners (e.g., seller,
buyer and carrier) will publish their data regarding a shipment in the EPCIS databases;
the data will then be available for other supply chain partners as well as for the
government.
Second, the redesign procedure takes imbedded control mechanism into account. The
imbedded control is realized via the application of the TREC4 smart seal technology for
container security, which has the following features: (1) sensors to monitor parameters
including humidity, temperature, shock and unauthorized container openings; (2) realtime container location traceability through continuous satellite connection; (3)
connection to backend systems during transport; and (4) ability to send information and
alerts in case of predefined rules (e.g., container arrives at or leaves a geo-zone;
temperature lower or higher than predefined limits). According to the BeerLL vision,
Beer Co. will ship its goods in TREC-armed containers. Being smart seals, the TREC
devices can ensure shipment integrity, and enhance security. By means of using handheld
devices, customs officers can use TREC devices to obtain access to the EPCIS databases
of all supply chain partners, where commercial data about shipments is available.

Instead of setting up separate direct links between each other, above mentioned organizations will
set up an inter-organizational information system (IOS) based on the same EPC standards. Each
partner in the network will extract the data they would like to share from their own Enterprise
Resource Planning (ERP) system to the client EPCIS, from which the shared data can be retrieved.
And a central EPCIS is applied as an intermediate, which provides directory service that
collecting, matching and submitting information to the connected parties automatically or based on
their query. TREC is used as an extra safe lock to ensure that critical information is achieved and
sent in real-time without fraud. TREC information is sent to the central EPCIS that can be
retrieved in real-time by network partners. If anything goes wrong (e.g., unauthorized opening of
container or change of information), TREC will send an automatic alert to the relevant parties.
Through such an information sharing schema, real time information sharing will be possible along
the supply chains. And for DutchTCA, it will get all relevant control information not only from
Beer Co. but also from other supply chain partners and TREC as well, which will make the
continuous auditing possible (See Figure 4). This IT solution of TREC (or similar technology),
EPCIS and the service-oriented architecture replaces the current situation where the customs data
is send from the business to DutchTCA via paper documents. This electronic exchange of data is
not only much more efficient than the paper-based exchange, but it also enables DutchTCA to look
for all kind of additional business data that can greatly improve the quality of their risk analysis of
a business.

3

For further details see http://www.epcglobalinc.org, last accessed on Oct 31, 2007.
Further information on TREC is available at http://www.zurich.ibm.com/news/05/trec.html and
http://www.zurich.ibm.com/csc/process/securetradelane.html, last accessed on Oct 31, 2007.
4
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Figure 4. BeerLL information sharing schema

Adverse Selection
The second issue as we discussed before is the adverse selection problem caused by the
information asymmetry during the public- private partnership (PPP) forming. Typically, when
government certifies businesses, such problem often results in a market failure that the “cherries”
are driven out and the market will be glutted with “lemons”. The adverse selection problem
puzzles the earlier discussed AEO certification as well. As the introduction of AEO will take legal
effect in the European Community (EC) from 1 January 2008 (Joint Customs Consultative
Committee (JCCC), 2007), further developing and guidelining the concept becomes an exigent
issue. By studying the BeerLL case, we figure out a way out of the AEO adverse selection
problem. We find that the application of advanced IT may serve as a strong signaling tool for
businesses to show their types, which will enable the government to effectively differentiate
“good” and “bad” companies for certification. “Signaling” has been considered as one of the most
important strategies of solving asymmetric information problems in the job market and capital
market [e.g., (Spence, 1973; Gertner et al., 1988)]. The general idea behind signaling is that one
party (informed party) conveys some meaningful information (signal) about itself to another party
(under informed party); with this extra information, the under informed party is able to
differentiate different types of the other party and make sensible selection decisions. O’Reilly
(1983) indicates that the quality of decision making increases with the decision maker’s
information level. However, if the quality of information itself can hardly or not at all be
evaluated, a decision-maker’s visible information behavior is often used as an evaluation
substitute for the quality of information and therefore decisions (Feldman & March, 1981). They
emphasize that information behavior can have important signaling effects on observers. In the
BeerLL scenario, good companies like Beer Co. positively signal themselves with the adoption of
the EPICS and TREC and the government (DutchTCA) will make the certificate procedure easier
and more attractive for them. In the meanwhile, for the “bad” company A, as the signaling cost of
implementing the required IT solution will overcome the potential fraud benefit it can get, it will
simply decide not to take the AEO certificate. Anyhow, if the “bad” company B would like to have
simplified tax and customs procedure and decides to take the AEO certificate, it needs to fulfill the
IT requirement by either using TREC or other similar IT support. The implementation of the
advanced IT solution itself will minimize the cheating possibilities of the “bad” companies and
may finally transfer the “bad” companies to “good” ones. At the same time, instead of passively
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receiving “signals” from applicants, DutchTCA can also actively screen 5 companies by
embedding the application of advance IT in the AEO requirement that all applied companies
should fulfill the IT requirement in order to get the certificate. With the IT screening from the
government side and positive signaling by using IT from the business side, the adverse selection
problem is tackled. The market will automatically correct itself that “good” companies will join
and stay and the “bad” ones will be kept out of the market (See Figure 5).

Figure 5. Advanced IT application for AEO certificate (Market correction)

Recommendations
By analyzing the BeerLL case with asymmetric information, we realize that procedure redesign is
not as simple as process automation or mere replacement of paper documents with the electronic
ones. Especially when organizations work together and form an inter-organizational network,
special concerns of information sharing need be taken into account: how the information can be
shared effectively with the minimum asymmetry, how the “lemons” can be avoided. As long as
these problems are addressed, for each asymmetric information problem, there exist (or will be)
solutions. Some of the requirements can be abstracted from the BeerLL case, i.e. (1) end-to-end
security, (2) data sharing with the supply chain and DutchTCA etc. We also suggest that AEO
should be protected against the danger of “lemons” that we recommend adding IT requirements to
help with signalling and screening.

Conclusions and Future Research
This paper presents a linkage between the economic theory of information asymmetry and IS
network and information flow research. Despite the asymmetric information problems in the
business world, we find that such problems are also prominent in the G2B context, in particular for
Tax and Customs offices. By studying a collaborative pilot between government and business--the Beer Living Lab, we identify two asymmetric information problems, namely, moral hazard and
adverse selection. We argue that application of advanced IT may effectively cope with the two
5

Screening is another way of combating adverse selection, different with signalling, which implies that the
informed agent moves first, screening means that underinformed party can induce the other party to reveal
their information, for example by providing a menu of choices in such a way that the choice depends on the
private information of the other party (Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1976).
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above motioned problems: IT based IOS enables network partners effectively sharing information
with each other that minimizes the moral hazard problem; and the application of IT itself may
serve as a strong signalling/screening tool for the network partners make sensible selection
decisions that overcomes the adverse selection problem. The findings from this paper may provide
valuable knowledge for the EU governments to further develop the AEO certification guidelines.
The paper at the current stage only reveals the phenomenon of asymmetric information during the
G2B network forming, its applications and some recommended solutions. The scope of the paper
will be expanded by our future research, which will further develop the conceptual framework and
validate it with both descriptive (case study) and quantitative (empirical research) method. Further
we will pay special attention to a dynamic network, that is, how changes of IT strategy of one
network partner may influence the behaviour and decision making of other network partners; what
the new equilibrium will be after this change and how this can be optimized. All in all, research of
information economics in the IS field is still under developing; this paper serves as an explorative
starting point, and hopefully it can inspire others to pursue research in this field.
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